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NOTES
DEFINITION OF THE MARKET IN TYING ARRANGEMENTS:
ANOTHER ASPECT OF TIMES-PICAYUNE*
Ix a tying arrangement, a seller or buyer conditions his dealing with others
in a market which he controls upon their dealing with him in a market where
he must compete.1 Such use of monopoly power in one market to secure an
advantage over competitors in another often runs afoul of the antitrust laws.2
A seller who uses tying arrangements to "lease or make a sale [of] com-
modities" may violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act.3 But buyers' practices
*Times-Picayume Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
1. Tying arrangements have been the subject of frequent definition. An excellent
example appears in Lockhart and Sacks' definitive article on exclusive arrangements:
"The distinctive feature of a tying arrangement is that a supplier furnishes a controlled
product, over which it usually has some degree of market control, on condition that the
user or dealer also purchase a tied product that would otherwise be available from the
supplier's competitors." Lockhart & Sacks, The Relevance of Economzic Factors in Dc-
termining Whethcr Exclusive Arrangements Violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 65
HAuv. L. REv. 913, 942 (1952). For a similar definition see Times-Picayune Publishing
Co. . United States, 345 U.S. 594, 614 (1953). One feature of these definitions is their
limitation to tying practices of sellers or lessors who overtly refuse to deal solely in the
"tying product." Recent extension of the tying arrangement doctrine to cover subtler
methods of coercion, and also buyers' as well as sellers' practices, necessitates more com-
prehensive definition. See note 44 infra. In United States v. Griffith, where coercion vas
inferred from buyers' simultaneous negotiations for exclusive rights in competitive and
non-competitive markets, and where two "products" were not actually "tied," the Court
isolated the essential offensiveness of tying arrangements: "The consequence of such a
use of monopoly power is that films are licensed on a non-competitive basis in what
otherwise would be competitive situations." United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 103
(1948).
On tying arrangements generally see Kahn, A Legal and Economic Appraisal of the
"New" Sherman and Clayton Acts, 63 YALE 1J. 293, 322-7 (1954) ; Loc Uhart & Sacks,
supra at 942-54.
2. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (leases of patented
salt dispensing machines conditioned on lessee's purchase of lessor's salt held to violate
§ 1 of Sherman Act, and § 3 of Clayton Act) ; International Business Machines Corp. v.
United States, 293 U.S. 131 (1936) (tying of tabulating cards to computing machines
violates § 3) ; Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 194 F.2d 433 (7th Cir. 1952)
(tying leases of vending machines to sales of candy violates § 3). But cf. Pick Mfg. Co.
v. General Motors Corp., 299 U.S. 3 (1936) (no § 3 illegality where sales of replacement
parts tied to sales of automobiles, because of reasonable relationship to preservation of
manufacturer's good will) ; FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923) (tying of
gasoline sales to leases of pumps approved for same reason).
3. Section 3 forbids "any person ... to lease or make a sale or contract for sle...
on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall
not use or deal in the goods ... or other commodities of a competitor or competitors of
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are not covered. And Section 3 is limited to leases and sales of tangible
commodities. Thus, tying sales of hazard insurance to mortgage loans does
not violate the Clayton Act, because a loan is not a lease or sale, and money
is not a commodity. 4 However, no such limitations are found in the Sher-
man Act. 5 General Motors' policy of refusing to sell automobiles unless pur-
chasers used GM financing unreasonably restrained trade under Section 1.0
And motion picture exhibitors who used buying power in one-theatre towns
to negotiate for films in competitive towns also violated the Act.1
In the Times-Picayune case,8 where the Government attacked forced com-
bination sales of newspaper advertising 9 under the Sherman Act,10 the
the lessor or seller . . .where the effect . . . may be to substantially lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce." 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14
(1946).
The condition not to deal in the goods of another can be inferred from the practical
effects of a tying arrangement. See cases cited in Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United
States, 345 U.S. 594, 607 n.23 (1953).
4. United States v. Investors Diversified Services, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 645 (D. Minn.
1951); cf. Fleetway, Inc. v. Public Service Interstate Trans. Co., 72 F.2d 761. (3d Cir.
1934) (provisions of § 2 of Clayton Act held inapplicable to bus fares for same reason).
5. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1946). Tying arrangements may be attacked
as unreasonable restraints of trade under § 1, International Salt Co. v. United States, 332
U.S. 392 (1947) ; United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948), or under the §2 pro-
hibition against monopolizing. United States v. Griffith, supra.
6. United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1941). See also
United States v. National City Lines, Inc., 186 F.2d 562 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S.
916 (1951) (tie-in of exclusive supply contracts to loans held illegal under § 2).
7. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
8. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953). For fuller
statement of the facts, see Kahn, A Legal and Economic Appraisal of the "New' Sherman
and Clayton Acts, 63 YA.E L.J. 293, 324-7 (1954). See also, Notes, 53 COL. L. Ra'. 1011
(1953) ; 102 U. OF PA. L. REv. 125 (1953). And see The Suprene Court, 1952 Term, 67
H~Av. L. REv. 91, 128 (1953).
9. Also known as "unit selling" plans, forced combination sales of advertising space
are widespread in the newspaper industry; the outcome of the Times-Picayune case was
a matter of concern to about 180 publishers who tied advertising sales in their morning-
afternoon combinations. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594,
604 (1953). See Comment, Local Monopoly in the Daily Newspaper Industry, 61 YALU
L.J. 948, 989 (1952).
10. The Government made no attempt to attack the Publishing Company's unit plan
under the Clayton Act, referring, on oral argument, to an informal opinion of the Federal
Trade Commission that advertising was not a "commodity" within the meaning of § 2(a)
of the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1946) ; 81 CONa.
REc. 2336-7 (1937) ; Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, supra note 9, at 609-
10 n.27. See text at notes 3, 4 supra. Although the Supreme Court declined to comment
on this issue, footnote 27 refers to the Commission's opinion as an "early" one, and tile
matter appears still open to adjudication. Ibid. For suggestion that the Court was "invit-
[ing] an attack upon unit advertising space arrangements based upon § 3," see Mattson,
Condition that the Lessee or Purchaser Shall Not Deal in the Goods of a Conpetitor in
A tmUCAN BAR AsSOCIATION SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAw 97, 101. (1953).
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Supreme Court for the first time established per se criteria" to test the
Section 1 legality of tie-in sales. The Court held that such arrangements
are illegal per se only when a "seller 12 enjoys a monopolistic position in the
market for the 'tying' product" and when "a substantial volume of commerce
in the 'tied' product is restrained."1 3 Since most tying arrangements will
affect a "substantial volume of commerce,"' 14 proof of defendant's market
11. The Times-Picayune statement of criteria for per se illegality under § 1 of Sher-
man was the first comprehensive pronouncement in this area. Only a few prior Supreme
Court decisions had invalidated tying arrangements under the Sherman Act. Intcrnational
Salt, which held that arrangements tying purchases of salt to leases of machines were illegal
per se under § 1, as well as § 3 of Clayton, left doubt whether the same result would obtain
where the tying product was not patented and § 3 was not involved. International Salt Co.
v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). But see Note, 48 CoL. I REv. 733, 740 (194S). Cf.
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 156-9 (1948), invalidating "block-
booking," or forced package sales of two or more copyrighted motion pictures. And insofar
as Griffith concerned § 1, it did not treat per se violation. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S.
100 (1948). See notes 5 supra and 16 infra. See also Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United
States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948), the companion case to Grifflth.
12. While the Court refers to "sellers" throughout the opinion, the Sherman Act criteria
set out, as well as the Court's subsequent discussion of market definition, see page 395
infra, would appear equally applicable to buyers, particularly in the light of United States
v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (194S), supra note 1.
13. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 609-10 (1953).
Dicta also substantiated prior indications that as long as a quantitatively substantial
volume of commerce in the tied market was affected, any tying arrangements falling with-
in § 3 language would be invalid under the Clayton Act. Id. at 603-09. See note 3 spra
and accompanying te.- In Intcrnitional Salt, which first enunciated the "quantitative
effect" test, the fact that the tying product was patented left open the possibility that stricter
proof would be required where no patent wvas involved. See also Oxford Varnish Corp. v.
Ault & Wiborg Corp., 93 F.2d 764, 766 (6th Cir. 1936) (arrangement tying purchases of
paint and varnish to lease of patented graining plates violated § 3 of Clayton where lessor's
proportionate share of national paint and varnish production was appromimately one and
one-half percent). And for further discussion of this test, see Note, 48 CoL- I Rav. 733,
740-1 (1948). But dicta in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949), which
involved not tying arrangements but agreements to purchase all the customers' requirements
from defendant, indicated that quantitative effect alone would be sufficient to invalidate a
tying arrangement under the Clayton Act. Id. at 304-06. The Tines-Picayune opinion, in
comparing criteria for illegality under Clayton and Sherman, supports this view, stating
that either proof of monopoly position in the tying market or proof that a substantial amount
of commerce in the tied product was affected, would be sufficient for illegality under § 3.
Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, supra at 60309.
But for a view questioning the Court's intention to make this a de minimis requirement,
see The Supre e Court, 1952 Term, 67 HAv. L. Rav. 91, 130 (1953).
14. The Court in Times-Picayune did not decide whether the "substantial volume of
commerce" necessary to condemn tying arrangements under § 1 is the same as that suffi-
cient under § 3 of the Clayton Act. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345
U.S. 594, 610 n.28 (1953). However, in International Salt, the Court employed a quantita-
tive measure of the volume of commerce affected for purposes of both the Clayton and Sher-
man Acts. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 395-6 (1947). And the
Court made short work of the requirement, basing its decision that "the volume of business
19541
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position will be decisive in establishing per se illegality, except where a
patented or copyrighted tying product provides prima facie evidence of market
control. 15 And evidence of an important market position short of monopoly
is also relevant in determining whether use of such arrangements, though
not illegal per se, unreasonably restrains trade or constitutes monopolization. 10
affected by [defendant's] contracts cannot be said to be insignificant or insubstantial . . ."
solely upon evidence that the Company's sales of salt affected by the arrangement amounted
to $500,000 in 1944. Id. at 396. See also Oxford Varnish Corp. v. Ault & Wiborg Corp.,
supra note 13. A recent discussion suggests that the severity of the "substantial effect" re-
quirement might, in § 1 cases, be made to depend upon the extent of market dominance in the
tying product. The Supreme Court, 1952 Term, 67 HARV. L. REV. 91, 130 (1953).
15. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 307 (1949): "A patent, ...
although in fact there may be many competing substitutes for the patented article, is at least
prima facie evidence of (market] control." See also Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v.
Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637, 640 (1947). Even prior to the Clayton Act, courts had
forbidden enlargement of the scope of the patent monopoly by tying arrangements. See,
e.g., Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917) (sales of
patented film projectors making right to use machines contingent upon use solely to show
films leased by seller held illegal).
For discussion of the doctrine that patentees must be held to higher standard under the
antitrust statutes than owners of other kinds of property, see Note, 57 YAu L.J. 1298 (1948).
16. See note 5 supra. In the GMAC case, where the unreasonableness but not per se
illegality of the tying arrangement was at issue, the Court referred to dicta in Apex Hosiery
Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940), to the effect that market control is an essential element
of all § 1 violations. United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376, 403 (7th Cir.
1941). A degree of market control equivalent to that necessary for per se illegality would
not be necessary to establish the unreasonableness of the tying arrangement under § 1. How-
ever, the strict criteria for proof of per se violation are intended to eliminate the need for
considering other variables among which market position is only one relevant to a "rule
of reason" analysis. Thus in Times-Picayune, the Court said: "[O]ur inquiry to determine
reasonableness under § 1 must focus on 'the percentage of business controlled, the strength
of the remaining competition and whether the action springs from business requirements
or purpose to monopolize.'" Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594,
615 (1953). See also United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 522 (1948). And
see pages 396-7 infra.
Practices not illegal in themselves may, when engaged in by a monopolist, be the basis
for an inference of general intent to monopolize. Thus legal monopoly of the type conferred
by ownership of the sole theatre in a town, or by patent or copyright, will facilitate proof
of a § 2 violation where, as in Griffith, the legal monopoly is used in a tying arrangement.
See United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105-107 (1948) ; United States v. Aluminum Co.
of America, 148 F.2d 416, 431-2 (2d Cir. 1945). And see Rostow, Monopoly Under the
Sherman Act: Power or Purpose?, 43 ILL. L. REv. 745 (1949). In view of these severe con-
sequences of being termed a "monopolist" under § 2, it would appear probable that the re-
quirement of "monopolistic position" necessary to invalidate a tying arrangement under § 1
is less stringent than that of § 2. The alternative use of "market dominance" for "monopo-
listic position" lends support to this idea. See Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United
States, 345 U.S. 594, 613, 614 (1953). And see United States v. American Can Co., 87 F.
Supp. 18 (N.D. Cal. 1949) (defendant controlled 54% of tying product-held illegal). See
also Kahn, A Legal and Economic Appraisal of tie "Newe" Sherman and Clayton Acts, 63
YALE L.J. 293, 322-4 (1954). But in Times-Picayune, 40% of the relevant market was held
insufficient for "market dominance." See text at note 30 infra.
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In Times-Picayune, the Court's definition of the relevant market defeated
allegations that the sole morning newspaper in New Orleans enjoyed a mo-
nopolistic or dominant position. The defendant Publishing Company had tied
sales of national and classified advertising in that paper '-- the largest in the
city s---to sales in one of two competing afternoon newspapers. Rejecting
both the Government's claim that the morning newspaper occupied a distinct
market,19 and defendant's contention that other advertising media, because
they competed with newspapers, should be included in their market,-0 the
Court found that the only relevant market 2 1 was one which included all three
newspapers)- Using this definition of the market, a 54 majority 2 held
17. The tied newspapers were the morning Times-Picayune and the evening States.
The independently owned evening Item was the only other daily in New Orleans.
18. The Times-Picayune far surpassed the States and the Item in both circulation and
linage. Thus, 1950 data showed a daily average circulation uf 128,402 for the Times-
Picayune, 114,660 for the Item, and 105,235 for the States. Times-Picayune Publishing Co.
v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 599 (1953). And "[d]uring the fuur years preceding the
introduction of the unit rate the Times-Picayune carried in excess of 50% more general
display advertising than the States or the Item." United States v. Times-Picayune Publish-
ing Co., 105 F. Supp. 670,676 (E.D. La. 1952).
The Supreme Court measured the Times-Picayunes share of the market solely in terms
of linage, on the theory that circulation figures were a measure only of its success in sell-
ing to its readers. 345 U.S. 594, 610, 612 (1953). But since the Court defined circulation
as the product sold to advertisers, taking linage figures alone appears inconsistent with the
usual practice of measuring market share in terms of the percentage of units of product sold.
See, e.g., Judge Hand's computation of Alcoa's share of the market in United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416,423 (2d Cir. 1945). And since, in addition to nor-
mal price differences, linage rates vary sharply in proportion to the size of a newspapr's
circulation, neither treatment would appear entirely indicative. Thus in actual practice,
price of advertising space is quoted in "line" and "milline" rates, the latter amalgamating
linage rate with circulation. Comment, Local Monopoly in the Daily NVe-zs aper I:dustry,
61 YALE L.J. 948,977 (1952).
19. Brief for Appellant, United States of America, pp. 28-9, Times-Picayune Publish-
ing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
20. Brief for Appellant, Times-Picayune Publishing Co., p. 79, Times-Picayune Pub-
lishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953). For a more detailed statement of this
contention see Brief on Behalf of 98 Newspaper Publishers as Amid Curiae, pp. 16-24,
Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, supra.
21. As the Court suggests, market position usually is measured by first defining a
single relevant market and then estimating the defendant's share. Times-Picayune Publish-
ing Co., 345 U.S. 594, 611 (1953), citing with approval, United States v. Columbia Steel
Co., 334 U.S. 495, 524 (1948). And see United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148
F.2d 416, 424 (2d. Cir. 1945). But an alternative approach taken in some cases is to lcok at
the defendant's percentage share in each of a number of possible relevant markets. See, e.g.,
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 32 U.S. 781, 794-SOO (1946) ; United States v.
American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 18, 21-2 (N.D. Cal. 1949). In cases where defendant is
charged with completed monopoly of a particular line of commerce or illegal use of lever-
age in one market to gain an advantage in another, it may be essential to single out one
relevant market. But see pages 397-8 infra.
22. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 613, 614 (1953).
23. Id. at 594. Mr. Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court. Mr. Justice Burton
dissented, joined by Justices Black, Douglas, and Minton. Id. at 628.
1954]
394 THE YALE LAW JOURNAL (Vol. 63
that the Publishing Company's advertising contracts were not illegal per se.24
The morning newspaper, or "tying product," having only 40 percent of a
market shared with two other newspapers, lacked a dominant position.2 6
Second, by finding that the relevant market included all three newspapers,
the Court precluded a determination that defendant had tied sales in com-
petitive and non-competitive markets.26 Finally, viewing the forced combina-
tion sales not as tying arrangements, but under the Sherman Act's general
prohibitions, the Court found neither unreasonable restraint of trade nor
attempt to monopolize.2 7
To reach its definition of the market, the Court reasoned that all three
newspapers sold indistinguishable units of the same product, which it defined
as New Orleans newspaper advertising readership. 28 The practical effect of
24. Id. at 614.
25. Id. at 612. It has been suggested that treatment of all three newspapers as one rele-
vant market logically would have required the Court to combine the Publishing Company's
morning and afternoon papers in computing the percentage of business controlled by the
defendant. Kahn, A Legal and Economic Appraisal of the "New" Sherman and Clayton
Acts, 63 YALE L.J. 293, 325 (1954) ; Note, 102 U. OF PA. L. REV. 125, 129 (1953). This
would have given a figure of roughly 75%. But the value of such a computation other than
for purposes of a rule of reason analysis under § 1 is dubious. Cf. note 16 supra. Once It
was established that all three newspapers constituted one market, the unit plan could not
be attacked as a tying arrangement. See text at note 26 infra. Refusals to sell are illegal
under the Sherman Act only if they are unreasonable under § 1. United States v. Colgate
& Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). And see Comment, Refusals to Sell and Public Control of
Competition, 58 YALE L.J. 1121 (1949).
26. "[N]o leverage in one market excludes sellers in the second, because for present
purposes the products are identical and the market the same." Times-Picayune Publishing
Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 614 (1953).
27. The Publishing Company's afternoon paper had been purchased from an inde-
pendent organization in 1933. Id. at 598. The Company's only competitor was the evening
Item.
Publication of a morning paper previously owned in conjunction with the Item had been
suspended in 1941. Ibid. Prior to its suspension, the Item Company had utilized unit rates,
and the fact that the Times-Picayune unit rates for classified advertising were adopted dur-
ing that period and subsequent to the Item's helped to convince the Court that defendant's
plan was adopted for normal business reasons. See id. at 623. And the fact that the compul-
sory unit rate for general display advertising had not been adopted until 1950 contributed to
the difficulty of showing detriment to the Item. Id. at 618-22. This factor was relevant only
when, having decided that the arrangements were not illegal per se, the Court went on to
consider whether they nevertheless unreasonably restrained trade. See note 16 and text at
note 24 supra. And see Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 627
(1953) : "The District Court, and much evidence supports its conclusions, determined that
the 1933 purchase ... then seemed a legitimate means of business expansion." Thus, the fact
of the purchase did not lend support to the Government's charge of specific intent necessary
to a finding of attempt to monopolize.
28. "[N]othing in the record suggests that advertisers viewed the city's newspaper
readers, morning or evening, as other than fungible customer potential. We must assume,
therefore, that the readership 'bought' by advertisers in the Times-Picayune, was the self-
same 'product' sold by the States and, for that matter, the Item." Id. at 613.
NOTES
finding that morning and afternoon papers sold the same product was to
establish a presumption that they were in the same market. And this pre-
sumption was decisive, because the Court found "no evidence which could
circumscribe a broader or narrower 'market' defined by buyers' habits or
mobility of demand."2 9
To justify its refusal to broaden the defendant's market, the Court estab-
lished a test which would exclude from the relevant market "any other
product to which, -ithin reasonable variations in price, only a limited number
of buyers will turn."' ° However, apparently relying upon its determination
that advertising readership constituted a single product, the Court did not
apply this test to consider the morning newspaper as a narrower relevant
market.3 ' Had the Court made such an analysis, it might have found that
the larger circulation of the morning newspaper would preclude advertisers
from turning to a competing paper, even though they did not distinguish
between morning and afternoon readers.
Thnes-Picayune's test for defining the market is subject to varying inter-
pretation. One application would require the court to include or exclude a
substitute product from the defendant's market on the basis of the number
of buyers who would turn to that product should defendant raise his price.
But such a determination would depend upon how the product were defined.
Evidence that only a limited number of customers would turn to each of a
number of other items would require the court to exclude all such items from
the defendant's market. However, if the aggregate of buyers who would turn
to all these items were a substantial number, the court could reach an opposite
result by defining all such items as a single product. Thus, radio, television,
and magazines might be excluded from the newspaper market if defined as
three products, but included if the customer potential 32 sold by all three were
defined as a single productPa
29. Id. at 612.
30. Id. at 612 n.31.
31. The Court explained its exclusion of other advertising media by reference to the
standard set forth, noting that "[t]he advertising industry and its customers ... markedly
differentiate between advertising in newspapers and in other mass media." Ibid. However,
the only indication that the Court applied the standard to place morning and afternoon papers
in the same market appears in its subsequent determination that the three newspapers sold
the same product. Id. at 613. In indicating that proof of "generic qualities" differentiating
their readers might warrant a contrary determination, the Court was following the stand-
ard's requirement that the willingness of buyers to substitute one product for another be
decisive in defining the market. Ibid. But whether or not readers of two newspapiers dif-
fered would be only one factor for consideration in determining whether advertisers would
substitute one paper for the other.
32. Cf. note 27 supra.
33. Another example of the arbitrary results that might be obtained in applying this
market test would be found in defining the market for Coca-Cola. Possible substitute prod-
ucts would be Pepsi-Cola, ginger ale, root beer, orange juice, and beer. Whether the first
three would be included in Coca-Cola's market might depend upon whether they were de-
fined as a single product-soft drinks.
1954]
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But in Sherman Act tying cases, definition of the market need not be a
prerequisite to determining per se illegality. Tying arrangements employ
coercive power in one market to eliminate competition in another. Such
power might be defined in terms of the amount of business (i.e., number of
customers and volume of sales) the defendant would lose if he raised his
price. While even a monopolist does not enjoy absolute power over pricea
the relationship between a rise in his price and his consequent loss of busi-
ness would reflect power to coerce.35 Under such a test, the nature and
number of products to which customers might turn would be irrelevant.
Thus in Times-Picayune, evidence that a reasonable rise in the rates of the
morning paper would not result in a substantial loss of advertising business
would be essential to a finding of "dominance" in the tying product. This
suggestion would be similar to the Court's test in using power over price
as the measure of sufficient market power to impose a tying arrangement
which would exclude competition. However, under this approach, courts
could find such power without defining a relevant market or arbitrarily de-
fining products. And consideration of all defendant's customers-including
those who cease using his product without turning to any substitute, and
those who turn to substitutes not included in his market-would ensure a
more accurate index of market power.
Tying arrangements not illegal per se still may unreasonably restrain trade
under Section 1.36 Even where a defendant lacks power over price, customers
who want the "tied" product may be indifferent to choice of supplier.37 Or
34. Monopoly is defined alternatively as power over price, or power to exclude corn-
petition. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 811 (1946), discussed in
Rostow, Monopoly Under the Sherman Act: Power or Purpose?, 43 ILL. L. Rvv. 745, 762
(1949). And see comparison of monopoly and price-fixing in United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 428 (2d Cir. 1945).
35. As a firm approaches monopoly power, it will be able to raise prices without unduly
decreasing sales. See SAMUELSON, EcoNoMics-AN INTRODUcTORY ANALYSIs 493 (1948).
If the firm's price is at its optimum point, a rise in prices will to some extent decrease
revenue but sales will not fall a substantial amount. The monopolist who is charging less
than his optimum price will be more successful in increasing price without losing revenue
or business.
36. See note 16 supra. The district court, which held the Publishing Company's unit
plan illegal under § 1, did not label it illegal per se. United States v. Times-Picayune
Publishing Co., 105 F. Supp. 670 (E.D. La. 1952). A motion for partial summary judgment,
which would have "labeled forced combination selling... a Sherman Act violation without
evidence of intent or actual effect on competitors" was denied. Comment, Local Monopoly
in the Daily Newspaper Industry, 61. YALE L.J. 948, 1004 n295 (1952).
37. See United States v. Investors Diversified Services, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 645 (D. Minn.
1951), discussed in Kahn, A Legal and Econonic Appraisal of the "Ne%" Sherman and
Clayton Acts, 63 YALE L.J. 293, 330 n.192 (1954). A fact situation like that in Inter.
national Salt, where lessees were required to purchase salt that they needed for use in the
lessor's machines exclusively from the lessor, might also be an example. International Salt
Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
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the disadvantage involved in the purchase of a "tied" product may be in-
substantial where the "tying" product represents a large, permanent invest-
ment.33 But whether the effect of the arrangement would be unreasonably to
restrain trade would depend in part upon defendant's market position.39 In
the GMAC case,40 where General Motors tied financing to automobile sales,
the court considered what it called GM%'s "dominant" position in the auto-
mobile industry and G 11's sole command over the supply of its cars. 41 Similar-
ly, in Times-Picayune, the district court looked at both the morning news-
paper's relative superiority among New Orleans newspapers and its monopoly
in the morning field to evaluate its market position." - Thus both courts took
a dual approach to market definition, looking not only at the position of the
tying product in the entire relevant market, but also at that product as a
separate market. This treatment of defendant's market position was neither
rejected nor approved by the Supreme Court; the Court's determination that
the Publishing Company sold a single product in a single market precluded
consideration of its unit plan as a tying arrangement. 43 However, such an
approach seems sound where distinctive characteristics of a tying product per-
mit a defendant whose relative position among competitors falls short of
monopoly unreasonably to restrain trade by tying arrangements.
Times-Picayune could lead to a new standard of legality for those tying
38. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1941). And
see te--t a  note 6 supra. Although there was some evidence that "many purchasers could
only buy a car on a small down payment and long terms, neither of which was available
under the GINAC plan," the fact that GM found it profitable to continue with the arrange-
ments would seem to indicate that the natural desire of customers to satisfy their first choice
in so substantial an investment as a new car outweighed the disadvantages of the financing
plan. United States v. General Motors Corp., supra at 396.
39. One factor to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of a restraint of trade
is the "strength of the remaining competition." Supra note 16. Since tying arrangements
are prohibited primarily because of their effect upon competition in the "tied" market,
position in that market may also be relevant for a "rule of reason" analysis. Thus, in the
GM11AC case, the Court noted that GMAC was the largest automobile financing company
in the world. United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F 2d 376, 393 (7th Cir. 1941).
40. Id. at 376.
41. Id. at 403. After noting that General Motors "had achieved a dominant position
in the automobile industry as manufacturer of cars desired by dealer-purchasers and many
members of the retail public," the Court added: "[Oif course, the utilization of the manu-
facturer's dominant position and the tremendous popularity of General Motors automobiles,
among other things heretofore explained, made it possible for the appellants to force the
sale of the related finance service." Id. at 400. The only evidence of GM's "dominant posi-
tion" in the industry considered by the Court was the fact that GM was the largest producer.
Id. at 398.
42. United States v. Times-Picayune Publishing Co., 105 F. Supp. 670, 674 (E.D. La.
1952). In discussing the Times-Picayune's market position, the court pointed to its "mo-
nopoly position in the morning field, and an enormous advantage in circulation, advertis-
ing linage and number of printed pages .... Ibid.
43. See text at notes 22,26 supra.
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arrangements-including buyers' practices 44-not encompassed by the Clay-
ton Act. Where a substantial volume of commerce in a "tied" market is
affected, per se illegality should result from a finding that defendant has power
over price in the "tying" market. But where conditions for per se illegality
are not met, the distinctiveness of the tying product should be considered, in
addition to defendant's degree of power in the entire relevant market for it, as
a factor which may result in an unreasonable restraint of trade.
44. See note 12 supra.
Power over price measures the extent to which a seller's command over supply of goods
enables him to exclude competition. The buyer's counterpart, command over market outlets,
is also measurable in terms of power over price. See supra note 34. Thus, monopoly buying
power (or monopsony) could be analyzed in terms of the volume of supplies a buyer would
lose if he lowered the price he was willing to offer.
